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Abstract _ 
Ramsey-type results dictate that an optimal pattern of taxes must tax more heavily 
those goods which have a more inelastic (compensated) demand. Corlett and Hague 
(1953) investigated the optimal revenue-neutral movements from an initial uniform tax. 
They obtained that the goods (relatively) more complementary to the untaxed good 
(leisure) should see their taxes increased-which in a revenue-neutral setting implies that 
the other goods see their taxes disminished. In a three-good economy (with only two 
goods being subject to taxation) the Ramsey-type rule and the Corlett-Hague result can 
be easily related. 
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A NOTE ON
 
RAMSEY AND CORLETT-HAGUE RULES
 
By EDUARDO lE}' 
Ramsey-type results dictate that an optimal pattern of taxes must tax 
more heavily those goods which have a more inelastic (compensated) de­
mand. Corlett and Hague (1953) investigated the optimal revenue-neutral 
movements from an initial unifonn tax. They obtained that the goods 
(relatively) more complementary to the untaxed good (leisure) should see 
their taxes increased-which in a revenue-neutral setting implies that the 
other goods see their taxes disminished. In a three-good economy (with 
only two goods being subject to taxation) the Ramsey-type rule and the 
Corlett-Hague result can be easily related. 
THE INVERSE ELASTICITY RULE, often referred to as the Ramsey rule, is one of 
the most well-known results in public finance. The most simple inverse elasticity 
rule is of the form ti!(Pi + ti) = klf.ii, where ti is the tax on good i, Pi is i's 
before-tax price, k is a constant, and f.ii is i's own-price elasticity of demand. 
It ignores any cross effects between the taxed goods, and, if iii is meant to be 
the marshallian demand price elasticity, any income effects. More complicated 
expressions are obtained when all the general equilibrium effects are properly 
taken into account. Corlett and Hague (1953) investigated the optimal revenue­
neutral movements from an initial uniform tax. They obtained that the goods 
(rel~tively) more complementary to the untaxed good (leisure) should see their 
taxes increased-which in u revenue-neutral setting implies that the other goods 
see their taxes disminished. 
Relating both themes, if th/; optimal pattern is a uniform ad valorem tax then 
the optimal Corlett-Hague movement would be no movement at all. Therefore, 
all goods must behave equally with respect to the untaxed good (and symmet­
rically between them). On the other hand, if the Corlett-Hague conceptual 
experiment implies that good j must see his tax burden increased and good 
k decreased, it has to be the case that the Ramsey-type rule suggests that j 
must be relatively more heavily taxed than k. An explicit relationship will be 
developed in this paper. 
In the first section, I shall derive the measure of excess burden used in the 
paper. In section two I shall introduce Ramsey-type results, and in section three 
the Corlett-Hague model. Finally, in the last section I shall relate both results. 
Financial support from a Bank of Spain Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. 
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2	 EDUARDO 1# 
1. MEASUREMENT OF LOSS FROM DISTORTING TAXES 
I will introduce, first, the assumptions about the model used throughout the 
paper. These are: 
• Three-good economy. Good	 1, leisure, will be the numeraire and will be un­
taxed (otherwise proportional taxation would be optimal). 
•	 Agents have no exogenous income (otherwise a lump-sum tax would be opti­
mal) and have the same preferences. 
•	 The technology is a linear one. Therefore, producer's prices, p, are constant. 
Final consumer prices, q, are the sum of the producer prices and the vector of 
taxes, t. Thus, q = p + t. 
The loss for any given tax vector can be measured as the negative of the 
compensating variation after the revenue collected has been returned to the 
consumers. The compensating variation will be given by 
cv =J.l(q;q,O) - J.l(q;p,O) =-J.l(q;p,O); 
where J.lO is the money-metric utility function. l Let UO _ v(p,O), then the 
burden L(t) due to the tax vector t can be expressed as 
L(t) =- (~tiXi(q, e(q, UO)) - J.l(q; p, 0)) 
3 
= e(q,'uO) - Ltihi(q,UO) 
i=2 
3 
= L(qi - t;)hi(q, UO) 
i=2 
3 
= LPihi(q, UO); 
i=2 
which is the value of the expenditure function at the after-tax price vector less 
the tax revenues collected~ and (conceptually) returned lump sum. From the 
last expression, it can be s~en that the loss equals the value, at pre-tax prices, 
of the cheapest post-tax bunule that yields the initial level of utility. 
1 I will be using Varian (1984) textbook's notation throughout the paper. Thus, the marshal­
lian demands will be denoted by Xi(p, m); hicksian demands by hi(P, u); expenditure function 
by e(p, u) and indirect utility function by v(p, m). Therefore, Il(qj p, m) == e(q, v(p, m)). Also, 
price vectors are row vectors while quantity vectors are column vectors. 
2 If the consumer were compensated so that she could stay at her initial utility level uO, her 
demand would be h(q, UO) and, in turn, the taxes collected would be th(q, UO). Actual taxes 
collected, tx(q, 0) are irrelevant here. 
3 
[ 
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[	 The marginal loss from a small change in one of the unit taxes is given by 
(1) 
The optimal pattern of taxes to raise T while minimizing the loss inflicted to 
the economy can be obtained by solving3 
mm	 L(t) 
3[J	 t 
s.t.	 L tihi(q, UO) = T. 
i=2 
Both demand and production are homogeneous of degree zero in p and q re­
spectively. Therefore, two normalizations are allowed. It's useful to make 
PI == ql == 1, which implies tl :: O. [	 The first order conditions give 
k =2,3. 
Rearranging, we get
lJ 
,\ 
1-,\ 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
3 IT either the equivalent variation were used instead of the compensating one, or the indirect 
utility function were maximized subject to the revenue constraint, similar results would be 
obtained. However, h(·) would be evaluated at different points in the resulting formulae­
i.e., at h(q,v(p,O)) with the CV and at x(q,O) with the EV. Thus, maxt v(q,O) +fJ 
,\ (Li tiXi(q,O) - T) is equivalent to mint L(t) + '1 (Li tih;(q,V(q,O» - T)i when L(t) 
uses the equivalent variation measure. This holds because we have only one consumer (or 
any arbitrary number of them as long they all have the same preferences). In a many-person 
economy, the expenditure approach and the indirect utility function one do not give the same 
answers. Fw-thermore, in this context the concept of loss in not well defined. 
[ 
[J 
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for k = 2,3. To exchange the approximately-equal sign for a plain-equal sign 
between equations (2) and (3), all we need is to have linear hicksian demands 
over the pertinent range. 
[J 
Equation (2) makes evident that the distortionary effects of any tax pattern 
come through the substitution effects. Two alternative tax patterns that raise 
the same revenues must have the same income effects and, therefore, can only 
be compared on the grounds of the inefficiencies they arise by the reallocation 
of resources. Equation (4) suggests that the optimal tax structure involves an 
equal proportionate change in the hicksian demands for all goods. 
o	 Equation (4) does not provide an explicit rule for the pattern of taxes but indicates what it must satisfy. The only way the first order conditions can be 
simultaneously satisfied is having goods (factors) whose compensated demands 
(supplies) are relatively inelastic subject to relatively higher taxes.4 
2. RAMSEY-TYPE RESULTS 
In our two-good economy, it's easy to manipulate (2) further to get 
[	 (5) 
[	 which implies that we are going to have tdq2 > t3/q3 whenever 
(6) 
[I
L	 Equation (6) confirms all the elasticity arguments discussed above and will be 
used to link up with the Corlett-Hague results. Let (ij denote the hicksian 
elasticity of good i with respect to fs price. Then, we can rewrite (6) as 
in particular, if the cross-price elasticities were zero, we'd need 
n Therefore, good 2 must be relatively more inelastic than good 3. LJ 
4 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) investigated under which conditions equal (uniform) propor­
tional taxation of all commodities (except labor, the numeraire) is optimal. They proved that 
uniform taxation is optimal if either (i) labor is in absolutely fixed supply-Le., uniform tax­
ation amounts to a lump-sum tax on labor rents as argued before--and (ii) preferences are 
homothetic. Also, if preferences have an additive representation then tax rates are inversely 
proportional to each commodity's income elasticity of demand. If preferences are additive in 
logarithms with equal coefficients, then all income elasticities equal one, and uniform taxation 
is optimal. 
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RAMSEY AND CORLETT-HAGUE 5 
From equation (5) we can also get a related expression which captures the 
same ideas, 
t2 1 (A ta )
q2 =(22 1 - A - qa (23 ; 
if cross-price effects are zero, this equation collapses to 
tk A 1 
-=----;
qk 1 - A (H 
which is the appealing inverse elasticity rule. Note that the relevant elasticity is 
the hicksian elasticity which won't necessarily agree with the marshallian elastic­
ity unless income effects are zero. Also, the assumption that cross effects vanish 
is a rather heroic n ." 
We can also obtain expressions in terms of the (observable) marshallian de­
mands. Using the identity hi(q,u) == Xi(q, e(q, u)) we can derive Slutsky's equa­
tion, 
which can be used to substitute ahk/aqj in (2), we get 
1 ~ (aXk(q, e(q, Uo)) aXk(q, e(q, Uo)) ( (0))) A 
L,; ti a + a Xi q, e q, u = 1 _ \ ; Xk (q,e (q,uO )) i==2 qi m A 
rearranging, we obtain 
(7) 
a a 
1 "" axdq,e(q,uO)) A TJk "" ° .( (o))L,;t; a. =1-\- ( O)L,;t;Xi(q,e(q,u)),Xk q,e q,u i=2 q. A e q,u i=2 
or, dropping arguments to make it look more compact, 
a a
-.!.- Lti aXk = _A_ _ 'T/k LtjX;; 
Xk i=2 aqi 1- A e(q,uO) i=2 
where 'T/k is good's i income elOl!lticty, 
Assuming the aXk/aq;'s are constant over the relevant range, the left-hand
 
side of (7) gives the percel;tage change in the marshallian demand (supply) of
 
the kth good (factor). Goods with high income elasticities should change by
 
greater amount. (Notice that this argument would suggest light taxation on
 
necessities against the conventional wisdom based on the inverse elasticity rule
 
that suggests heavy taxation on necessities.)
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3. CORLETT-HAGUE RESULTS 
In this section, I will consid,~r revenue-neutral substitution among taxes to deriveII, the Corlett-Hague results. Total revenue is given by 
L ..J 
3 
T = Ltihi(q,uO), 
i=2 
differentiating T with respect to t, we get 
o
 
lJ
 
(J
 In particular,
 
(8) 
[J 
Setting T =Rand dT =0 uetermines all possible tax substitutions that keep 
revenue unchanged. Since we only have two"taxes here, we must have 
o or 
(9) 
The marginal loss due to this change is given by 
[J 
Consider (marginally) substituting a tax on good 3 by a tax on good 2, the 
proposed change does produce a movement towards efficiency if 
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o 
Corlett and Hague (1953) examined the efficiency gains obtained by moving 
away from equal proportional taxes on two goods in this three-good economy. 
Assume initially t2 = TP2 and t3 =TP3, so qi = (1 + T)Pi. From the expression 
above, 
dL oL dt21 oL 
dt3 = Ot2 dt3 T=R + Ot3 
= _ (t 2oh2 + t3 Oh3) dt21 _ t2 oh2 _ t3 oh3 . OQ2 Oq2 dt3 T=R Oq3 OQ3 
The homogeneity conditions imply 
D (10) 
c 
[J also 
so 
dL T (Oh l dt21 Oh l )LJ dt3 = 1 + T OQ2 dt3 T=R + OQ3 . 
Next, differentiating hI with respect to t3 subject to the normalization and the 
revenue constraint, 
dh l oh l dt21 oh l 
dt3 = OQ2 dt3 T=R + OQ3'1I Therefore, substituting this last expression we getu 
dL T dh l(11 ) dt3 - 1 + T dt3 . 
The sign of dhddt3 depenCls on the relative magnitude of the elasticities of the 
two goods with respect to leisure. Using equations (9) and (8), we have that 
D 
D 
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[J	 Thus, 
o	 (12) 
Assuming the denominator is positive,5 whenever (a1 > £21 we'll have dL/dta > 0[J so the loss will decrease if ta decreases. If, on the other hand, (a1 < £21 then lowering the tax on good 2 will produce a movement towards efficiency. 
o 
Thus, the sign of dhddta depends on the substitution terms. In particular, 
if 2 and 1 are substitutes, 3 and 1 must be complements and dhddta < 0 so 
o 
the loss decreases. Hence the good that is complementary to leisure should be 
taxed. If both were substitutes, the tax should be raised on the good relatively 
more complementary with leisure. 
4. RELATING RAMSEY AND CORLETT-HAGUE RUL-ES 
n	 Equation (6) stated the condition that would lead to an optimal tax pattern 
with t2/q2 > ta/qa, which was 
D 
o
 using equation (10), it can he rewritten as
 
(13) 
Ll	 or 
c	 (14) 
Thus, if both goods are leisure substitutes-in a hicksian sense-the above elas­
ticities are positive and 2 would be more complementary-i.e., less substitute­
o than 3. The other way equation (13) might hold is with 2 being complementary to leisure and 3 being substItute, in which case the left hand side of the inequality 
is negative and the right hand side is positive. Finally, if the hicksian demand 
of good 2 (good 3) does not respond to changes in the price of leisure we need 
good 2 (good 3) to be substitute (complementary) to leisure. 
[J 
In summary, equations (12) and (14) convey the same message that the good 
(relatively) more complementary to leisure should bear a (relatively) higher tax. 
Squash racquets, tennis shoes and good books are to be the innocent victims of 
Ramsey, Corlett and Hague. 
o 5 Equation (12) could give perverse results if goods 1 and 2 were hicksian-substitutes and it turned out that the denominator were negative.. 
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